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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-DEFAMATIoN-PRIVILEGED CoMMuNICATIONs.-Plaintiff brought
an action in trespass in the nature of libel against the executors of an estate
to recover damages as a result of a paragraph in decedent's will referring
to her, while omitting mention of her name, as being illegitimate. Testator
had from time to time over a period of twenty-seven years fought the plain-
tiff in court. Trial court entered a judgment for the defendant, nothwith-
standing a verdict in the trial for the plaintiff for $150,000. Held, judg-
ment for the defendant sustained on the ground that the action of the
testator in putting into his will the particular language he used was a
privileged one. Nagle v. Nagle et al. (Pa. 1934) 175 Atl. 487.
In rendering its opinion there seems to have been confusion in the
court's mind between absolute and qualified privilege. In the dicta the
court attempts to extend the doctrine of absolute privilege in court pro-
ceedings to the publication of a will. The court sees no reason why the
decision in Kemper v. Fort (1907) 219 Pa. 85, 67 Atl. 991, cannot be ex-
tended to the present case; there it was held that where an executor of an
estate, in an answer to a petition, asserted the illegitimacy of the plaintiff,
such an assertion was absolutely privileged where pertinent.
The prevailing American view with regard to absolute privilege is that
defamatory words, to avail themselves of this defense, must be relevant or
pertinent. Bussewitz v. Wisconsin Teachers' Association (1925) 188 Wis.
121; 205 N. W. 808. Hardtner v. Salloum (1927) 148 Miss. 346 114 So. 621.
A minority of the American states follow the English rule that defamatory
statements, under appropriate circumstances, may be absolutely privileged
even if not relevant or material. Munster v. Lamb (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 588,
49 L. T. 252; Sebree v. Thompson (1907) 126 Ky. 223, 103 S. W. 374;
Hunckel v. Voneiff (1888) 69 Md. 179, 14 At. 500. These rulings are based
on the general ground of public policy and are strictly limited to three
classes of communications: (1) Proceedings of legislative bodies; (2)
Judicial proceedings; (3) Communications by military or naval officers or
in official proceedings authorized by law. Hale v. Lea Co. (1923) 191 Cal.
202, 215 Pac. 500; Raymond v. Croll (1925) 233 Mich. 268, 206 N. W. 556.
Pleadings are included under the second class of statements which are abso-
lutely privileged when relevant or pertinent. MeGhee v. Insurance Co. of
North America (C. C. A. La. 1902) 112 F. 853; Abbott v. National Bank
(1899) 220 Wash. 552, 56 Pac. 376. The tendency of the courts has been
to restrict the rule of absolute privilege rather than to extend it. Pecue V.
West (1922) 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. W. 515.
The logic behind the court's extension of the rule of absolute privilege
in the instant case is in the reasoning that the publication of a will "is
closely analagous to a plaintiff's statement in a civil action in the respect
that it is the beginning of a judicial proceeding." The probate of a will is
publication of libel contained therein. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co. (1914)
128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584; Gallagher's Estate (1900) 10 Pa. Dist. 733;
contra, Hendricks v. Citizens and Southern National Bank (1931) 176 Ga.
692, 168 S. E. 313. But the reasoning in the case and the decision itself
do not support the court's statements as to absolute privilege. The court
justifies the libel in the will not only on the ground that it is pertinent,
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which would measure up to the requirements of absolute privilege, but also
on the ground that there is "no apparent purpose to injure." Here the
court is clearly talking of qualified privilege, where it is necessary to dis-
prove malice. Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co. (1925) 163 Minn. 226, 203
N. W. 974.
Authorities referred to by the instant cases support only qualified privi-
lege. There are few cases referring to wills in particular as privileged docu-
ments. Appellate court in Hendricks v. Vitizens and Southern National
Bank, above, held that statements of the testator unnecessarily intimating
that plaintiff was illegitimate were not privileged. There is no reason why
libellous statements in a will, when falling within the limits of qualified
privilege, should not be defensible on this ground. Statements are quali-
fiedly privileged when made in good faith upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest or duty and the party communi-
cated to has a like interest or duty or when made for the protection of
private interests. Wise v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman and En-
gineers (C. C. A. Iowa 1918) 252 F. 961; Alexander v. Vann (1920)
180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 360; Berry v. City of New York Insurance Co.
(1923) 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290; Newell on Slander and Libel, (4th Ed.
1924) p. 415. The facts in the present case clearly fall under this inter-
pretation. But extending the defense of absolute privilege to them would
open wide the doors for future extensions to all documents which will
eventually figure in a court proceeding. The court, in introducing this
subject is only confusing further the law of qualified privilege which was
sufficiently confused before. The decision in Nagle v. Nagle is undoubtedly
good law, but the dicta are superfluous and perplexing.
J. H. W. '87.
TRIAL-INsTRuCTIoNs-DUTY TO REQUEST-The judge permitted a per-
sonal injury case to go to the jury after the plaintiff had failed to submit
any instruction other than one on the measure of damages. The defendant
objected and on appeal urged this to be error. Held, that it is within the
"inherent power and duty of the court to see to it that the jury be in-
formed as to the law of the case. Where prejudice results to the losing
party by reason of the court's failure so to do, and the appellant properly
saves the point, the judgment should be reversed and remanded. The de-
fendant, however, was not prejudiced in this case. Dorman v. East St.
Louis R. R. Co. (Mo. 1934) 75 S. W. (2) 854.
The instant case changes a rule of appellate practice which for years
had been firmly established in Missouri, one which has had an interesting
history. The early pronouncements of the Supreme Court were to the effect
that it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury on all principles of law
applicable to the facts in evidence. To refuse to do so was error. McKnight
and Bradley v. Wells (1821) 1 Mo. 13; Coleman v. Roberts (1821) 1 Mo.
97. This rule persisted until in Drunj and Wiseman v. White (1847) 10
Mo. 224 the court in considering a case submitted to the jury without in-
structions, held that it was too late to contend on appeal that the jury
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